Troubleshooting Real Estate Transaction Problems Seminar in Philadelphia, PA

Troubleshooting Real Estate Transaction Problems Seminar in Philadelphia, PA on March 2, 2015

Harper J. Dimmerman, Attorney at Law, focuses his law practice of real estate law. He handles both litigation and transactional matters: (215) 545-0600. If you need an attorney for settlement, negotiation, For Sale by Owner (FSBO) transactions or litigation (mechanics’ liens, confession of judgment, partition, trespass, landlord tenant, foreclosure defense, ejectment, quiet title, breach of contract, contract litigation, seller disclosure fraud, home inspection cases, realtor negligence cases, amongst others).

Mr. Dimmerman will be lecturing to other attorneys on the topic of real estate law and ethics. The full outline (copyright NBI 2015) may be accessed here: http://www.nbi-sems.com/Enbi/Faculty/68011.pdf

The outline for the ethics portion is as follows:

  1. Applying Rules of Professional Conduct in Real Estate Practice
  2. Multiple Representation and Conflicts of Interest
  3. Disclosure Requirements
  4. Dealing with Unrepresented Parties
  5. Attorney Fees

 

Philadelphia Quiet Title Lawyer

Philadelphia Quiet Title Lawyer

Harper J. Dimmerman, Attorney at Law, focuses his law practice of real estate law. He handles both litigation and transactional matters: (215) 545-0600. If you need an attorney for settlement, negotiation, For Sale by Owner (FSBO) transactions or litigation (mechanics’ liens, confession of judgment, partition, trespass, landlord tenant, foreclosure defense, ejectment, quiet title, breach of contract, contract litigation, seller disclosure fraud, home inspection cases, realtor negligence cases, amongst others).

According to the Philadelphia Common Pleas Court, an suit to quiet title may be used for the following purpose:

“Quiet Title

An action to quiet title is a lawsuit brought in a court having jurisdiction over land disputes, in order to establish a party’s title to real property against anyone and everyone, and thus “quiet” any challenges or claims to the title. It comprises a complaint that the ownership (title) of a parcel of land or other real property is defective in some fashion, typically where title to the property is ambiguous. A typical ground for complaint includes the fraudulent conveyance of a property, perhaps by a forged deed or under coercion. Unlike acquisition through a deed of sale, a quiet title action will give the party seeking such relief no cause of action against previous owners of the property.”

Keep in mind that if you believe you have been the victim of deed fraud, you have recourse and should act at once.

Philadelphia Confession of Judgment Defense

Philadelphia Confession of Judgment Defense

Harper J. Dimmerman, Attorney at Law, focuses his law practice of real estate law. He handles both litigation and transactional matters: (215) 545-0600. If you need an attorney for settlement, negotiation, For Sale by Owner (FSBO) transactions or litigation (mechanics’ liens, confession of judgment, partition, landlord tenant, foreclosure defense, ejectment, quiet title, breach of contract, contract litigation, seller disclosure fraud, home inspection cases, realtor negligence cases, amongst others).

Pennsylvania’s Rules of Civil Procedure does permit a defendant to challenge a confession judgment, which is mechanism employed by commercial lenders and landlords in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Upon default, the lender or landlord may confess judgment, assuming that the proper contractual disclosures have been made. This remedy is generally perceived as highly draconian, in that the party alleging a default may have the ability to take an immediate judgment against the other party and for substantial sums of money. If you are the defendant in this type of action, it is imperative that you act promptly and assert any and all defenses. A party’s failure to do this could easily result in a crippling judgment against the defendant.

The pertinent Rule of Civil Procedure provides the following:

“Striking off or Opening Judgment. Pleadings. Procedure

(a)(1)  Relief from a judgment by confession shall be sought by petition. Except as provided in subparagraph (2), all grounds for relief whether to strike off the judgment or to open it must be asserted in a single petition. The petition may be filed in the county in which the judgment was originally entered, in any county to which the judgment has been transferred or in any other county in which the sheriff has received a writ of execution directed to the sheriff to enforce the judgment.

(2)  The ground that the waiver of the due process rights of notice and hearing was not voluntary, intelligent and knowing shall be raised only

(i)   in support of a further request for a stay of execution where the court has not stayed execution despite the timely filing of a petition for relief from the judgment and the presentation of prima facie evidence of a defense; and

(ii)   as provided by Rule 2958.3 or Rule 2973.3.

(3)  If written notice is served upon the petitioner pursuant to Rule 2956.1(c)(2) or Rule 2973.1(c), the petition shall be filed within thirty days after such service. Unless the defendant can demonstrate that there were compelling reasons for the delay, a petition not timely filed shall be denied.

(b)  If the petition states prima facie grounds for relief the court shall issue a rule to show cause and may grant a stay of proceedings. After being served with a copy of the petition the plaintiff shall file an answer on or before the return day of the rule. The return day of the rule shall be fixed by the court by local rule or special order

(c)  A party waives all defenses and objections which are not included in the petition or answer.

(d)  The petition and the rule to show cause and the answer shall be served as provided in Rule 440.

(e)  The court shall dispose of the rule on petition and answer, and on any testimony, depositions, admissions and other evidence. The court for cause shown may stay proceedings on the petition insofar as it seeks to open the judgment pending disposition of the application to strike off the judgment. If evidence is produced which in a jury trial would require the issues to be submitted to the jury the court shall open the judgment.

(f)  The lien of the judgment or of any levy or attachment shall be preserved while the proceedings to strike off or open the judgment are pending.

(g)(1)  A judgment shall not be stricken or opened because of a creditor’s failure to provide a debtor with instructions imposed by an existing statute, if any, regarding procedures to follow to strike a judgment or regarding any rights available to an incorrectly identified debtor.

(2)  Subdivision (g)(1) shall apply to (1) judgments entered prior to the effective date of subdivision (g) which have not been stricken or opened as of the effective date and (2) judgments entered on or after the effective date.”

Philadelphia Foreclosure Defense Lawyer

Philadelphia Foreclosure Defense Lawyer

Harper J. Dimmerman, Attorney at Law, focuses his law practice of real estate law. He handles both litigation and transactional matters. If you need an attorney for settlement, negotiation, For Sale by Owner transactions or litigation (mechanics’ liens, confession of judgment, partition, landlord tenant, foreclosure defense, ejectment, quiet title, breach of contract, contract litigation, seller disclosure fraud, home inspection cases, realtor negligence cases, amongst others).

It is critical that you defend the foreclosure litigation immediately, even if you may be endeavoring to achieve a short sale or work out some other agreement with the lender. Failure to respond accordingly will lead to a default judgment being taken against you, thereby making the prospect of resolving the situation amicably far more challenging. The failure to answer the complaint in foreclosure will be viewed by a court as an admission of the truth of all of the bank’s averments, some of which may not be entirely accurate. Finally, assuming that a court will simply permit the borrower to open that judgment and have a second bite at the apple, if you will, is a highly risky assumption.

Philadelphia Real Estate Lawyer

Philadelphia Real Estate Lawyer

Harper J. Dimmerman, Attorney at Law, focuses his law practice of real estate law. He handles both litigation and transactional matters. If you need an attorney for settlement, negotiation, For Sale by Owner transactions or litigation (mechanics’ liens, confession of judgment, partition, landlord tenant, foreclosure defense, ejectment, quiet title, breach of contract, contract litigation, seller disclosure fraud, home inspection cases, realtor negligence cases, amongst others).

Alert:

Philadelphia’s tax abatement program is a wonderful incentive for homebuyers. However, even when these abatements have been approved and advertised as such, buyers are running into a major problem upon taking ownership if the seller/selling entity has other outstanding tax liabilities with the City of Philadelphia. In these instances, the innocent buyer may not receive the benefit of the abatement, potentially costing that buyer(s) tens of thousands of dollars in unanticipated taxes. Thus, even with title insurance, it is essential that a real estate lawyer be engaged prior to closing to ensure that written documentation be obtained from the City of Philadelphia to confirm that the abatement is ripe.

Philadelphia Legal Malpractice Lawyer

Philadelphia Legal Malpractice Lawyer

Harper J. Dimmerman, Attorney, is a seasoned litigator and has recently added legal malpractice law as a new area of practice.

Statutes of limitation in any litigation matter in Pennsylvania oftentimes present serious roadblocks for otherwise viable claims. In the realm of legal malpractice, generally two years is the operative time frame which an aggrieved party has to bring a claim. Potential plaintiffs frequently ask when this clock begins to run, if you will. The simple answer is that this period commences as soon as the conduct which forms the basis of the action occurs: the happening of the alleged breach of duty. For practical purposes then, this clock may start even during the representation period, with the lawyer or law firm that could possibly be the subject of that very legal malpractice suit.

 

Partition and Philadelphia Real Estate Law

Partition and Philadelphia Real Estate Law by Harper J. Dimmerman, Attorney at Law. Mr. Dimmerman handles real estate litigation and partition matters. Contact him now for a consultation – (215) 545-0600. His office is located in center city Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.

Co-owners of real estate have a right to partition. This is supported by the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure.

In a Philadelphia Common Pleas Court decision handed down in November, 2012, the trial court was asked to consider a partition claim by an ex-husband. More specifically, ex-husband argued that he still have a right to real estate, despite not having perfecting his economic claims during the divorce proceeding. Post-divorce, ex-husband filed a suit in partition (approximately one year later) and contended that an oral agreement existed which required the preparation and recording of a deed during the marriage; this never happened. The ex-wife denied the existence of such an agreement. The Philadelphia trial court analyzed the statute of frauds, in light of the claim that there was an oral contract. That statute prohibits the creation of interests in any land by parol evidence. This is particularly true where a spouse seeks to compel the specific performance of such a contract by the other spouse. Also, the payments of repairs and mortgage installments does not take the case away from the statute of frauds. Here the ex-husband could not meet the particularly high burden of proof required to prove the existence of an oral contract. These parties were not even tenants by the entireties while they married, stated the trial court.

Bottom line: always get every deal in writing.  

Real estate law fraud article co-authored by a Philadelphia attorney

Unauthorized reproduction is expressly prohibited. Copyright ALM 2015

“Proving Fraud in a Residential Real Estate Transaction” by Harper J.  Dimmerman  and  James  M.  Lammendola, ” The  Legal  Intelligencer”, Publication date: January  6,  2015 (Real estate law fraud article co-authored by a Philadelphia attorney. The article discusses Pennsylvania’s disclosure laws in a residential real estate deal).

Litigators  know  that  proving  fraud  against  a  seller  in  the  residential  real  estate  context  can  be  challenging and  being  awarded  damages  for  fraud  even  more  so.  The  recent  decision  in  Floyd  v.  Wigfield,  (Oct.  2014, Lehigh  Co.,  No.  2012-­C-­4131),  handed  down  this  past  October,  provides  a  useful  analysis  of  the  facts and  types  of  claims  that  should  be  considered.  The  case  also  serves  as  a  reminder  that  failure-­to-­disclose cases  continue  to  be  litigated  in  our  state.  This  is  so  despite  the  requirement  in  the  1996  Real  Estate Seller  Disclosure  Law  (68  Pa.C.S.A.  Section  7301)  requiring  material  defects  to  be  disclosed  in  writing before  an  agreement  of  sale  for  residential  real  estate  is  signed  as  well  as  the  1968  Unfair  Trade Practices  and  Consumer  Protection  Law  (73  P .S.  Section  201-­1  et  seq.),  made  applicable  to  residential real  estate  transactions  by  the  Superior  Court  in  1987.

The  facts  are  straightforward  enough:  Shannon  Floyd,  Norman  D’Avanzo  and  Ruth  D’Avanzo  (the buyers),  purchased  property  in  Emmaus,  Pa.,  from  Edward  and  Carol  Wigfield  (the  sellers)  on  Oct.  9, 2010.  During  their  ownership,  the  sellers  made  various  improvements  to  the  property,  including  the conversion  of  a  barn  on  the  site  into  multiple  apartment  units  and  alterations  to  the  wastewater  system. The  sellers  were  the  only  owners  in  the  chain  of  title  prior  to  the  sale  to  the  buyers.  They  listed  the property  and  prepared  various  documents,  including  a  required  seller’s  property  disclosure  statement  that did  not  disclose  any  information  on  any  code  violations.  The  property  was  marketed  as  having  two income-­producing  rental  units,  in  addition  to  the  main  residence  being  ready  for  use.

Post-­settlement,  an  issue  arose  with  the  tenants  (the  rental  units  were  occupied  at  the  time  of  the transfer)  and  an  inspection  by  Upper  Milford  Township  exposed  several  violations.  These  violations included  the  fact  that  the  property  had  never  been  approved  for  multiple  rental  units.  The  buyers  sought zoning  relief,  in  the  form  of  a  variance;;  the  request  was  eventually  granted.  But  the  variance  was conditioned  upon  an  inspection  of  each  of  the  rental  units.  In  the  course  of  this  process,  it  was  discovered that  the  septic  system  servicing  the  dwelling  units  was  non-­compliant,  necessitating  a  new,  compliant system  with  an  approximate  cost  of  $40,000.

As  a  result  of  their  reliance  upon  the  disclosures  either  made  or  omitted  by  the  sellers,  the  buyers commenced  litigation  in  the  Lehigh  County  Court  of  Common  Pleas.  The  multicount  complaint  averred common-­law  misrepresentation  as  well  as  violations  of  both  the  Real  Estate  Seller  Disclosure  Law (RESDL)  and  the  Unfair  Trade  Practices  and  Consumer  Protection  Law  (UTPCPL),  inter  alia.  The  thrust of  the  buyers’  suit  was  that  the  sellers  misrepresented  the  condition  of  the  property,  thereby  entitling  them to  actual  damages  amounting  to  the  cost  of  the  septic  system,  treble  damages  and  attorney  fees.

Notably,  at  the  bench  trial,  the  sellers  stipulated  to  the  fact  that  they  knew  permits  were  required  and intentionally  did  not  obtain  them.  The  court  made  an  additional  finding  of  fact  that  the  sellers  represented on  the  disclosure  statement  that  they  were  unaware  of  any  material  defects  on  the  property.  A  material defect  is  defined  by  case  law,  the  RESDL  and  the  disclosure  statement  as  “a  problem  with  residential  real property  or  any  portion  of  it  that  would  have  a  significant  impact  on  the  value  of  the  property  or  that involves  an  unreasonable  risk  to  people  on  the  property.”  Section  7304-­16  of  the  RESDL  includes  “legal issues  affecting  title  that  would  interfere  with  use  and  enjoyment”  in  its  list  of  what  may  qualify  as  a material  defect.  Section  19-­D  of  the  disclosure  statement  requires  disclosure  of  any  zoning,  housing, building,  safety,  or  fire  code  violations.

In  its  conclusions  of  law,  the  court  relied  heavily  on  the  oft-­cited  Pennsylvania  Supreme  Court  case  Bortz v.  Noon,  729  A.  2d,  555  (Pa.  1999),  in  analyzing  the  sellers’  conduct.  There  is  nothing  in  the  opinion  that mentions  a  defense  for  failing  to  disclose  that  the  apartments  were  in  violation  of  zoning  law  but  the sellers  apparently  tried  to  posit  the  defense  that  the  septic  system  functioned  properly.  The  court  noted that  this  defense  was  only  relevant  to  the  “idea  that  [sellers]  never  thought  their  deceit  would  be uncovered.”

Once  reliance  on  a  misstatement  of  fact,  or  concealment  of  a  material  defect  is  established  as  fact,  then the  intent  to  fraudulently  inflate  the  value  of  the  property  is  established  for  the  purpose  of  finding  a material  defect.  As  a  consequence  of  holding  that  both  the  intentional  misrepresentation  and  a  violation  of the  RESDL  occurred,  the  court  granted  the  plaintiffs  compensatory  damages  in  an  amount  sufficient  to bring  the  septic  system  into  compliance.  The  RESDL  allows  actual  damages  under  Section  7311  but  does not  preclude  punitive  damages  or  “any  other  remedies  applicable  under  other  provisions  of  law.”

The  UTPCPL’s  catch-­all  21st  unfair  trade  practice  definition  is  “any  other  fraudulent  or  deceptive  conduct which  creates  a  likelihood  of  confusion  or  of  misunderstanding,”  which  has  been  interpreted  as  requiring proof  of  common-­law  fraud  by  the  Superior  Court  in  2000  in  Booze  v.  Allstate  Insurance,  750  A.2d  877. Section  201-­9.2  also  provides  that  “the  court  may  in  its  discretion,  award  up  to  three  times  the  actual damages  sustained,”  plus  reasonable  attorney  fees.

As  in  many  cases,  the  court  declined  to  award  treble  damages,  which  is  discretionary  under  UTPCPL Section  201-­9.2(a),  despite  an  explicit  finding  of  intentional  conduct,  coupled  with  the  finding  of  fact  that one  of  the  sellers  was  a  former  township  zoning  officer  who  “was  familiar  with  zoning  hearing  procedures, zoning  laws,  building  laws,  and  septic  system  laws.”  The  court  found  treble  damages  inappropriate  but did  not  explicitly  state  its  reasoning.  Nonetheless,  the  court  did  award  about  $20,126  in  attorney  fees, which  was  the  exact  amount  prayed  for  since  said  sum  met  the  four  factors  under  McCauslin  v.  Reliance Finance,  751  A.2d  683  (Pa.  Super  2000).

Floyd  serves  as  yet  another  reminder  of  the  multiple  causes  of  action  available  in  a  residential  failure-­to-­ disclose  case,  the  specific  remedies  attached  to  the  various  claims,  and  that  treble  damages  are  not awarded  as  a  matter  of  course.  Although  the  threat  of  treble  damages  did  not  serve  as  a  deterrent  to  this litigation,  the  threat  of  treble  damages  and  counsel  fees  makes  the  UTPCPL  a  necessary  supplement  to RESDL  and  common-­law  failure-­to-­disclose  claims.

Harper  J.  Dimmerman  is  an  adjunct  professor  at  Temple  University’s  Fox  School  of  Business.  His  office represents  clients  in  various  litigation  and  real  estate  law  matters  and  he  can  be  reached  at harper@hjdlaw.net  or  215-­545-­0600.

James  M.  Lammendola  is  an  assistant  professor  at  Temple  University’s  Fox  School  of  Business  who was  in  private  practice  for  20  years.  He  can  be  reached  at  james.lammendola@temple.edu  or  215-­204-­ 4124.

Real estate law – Is Religious Group Committing a Trespass or Nuisance in Phila.?

Is Religious Group Committing a Trespass or Nuisance in Phila.? by James M. Lammendola and Harper J. Dimmerman, The Legal Intelligencer All rights reserved. ALM 2014. Unauthorized reproductions are prohibited. Published on November 4, 2014. The article addresses real estate law and litigation in Philadelphia County, Pennsylvania.

On Oct. 14, the state Superior Court released its decision in Liberty Place Retail Associates v. Israelite School of Universal Practical Knowledge, (2014 PA Super 233, No. 2557 EDA 2013), and upheld the denial of a request for a permanent injunction, by a Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas judge, to prohibit the weekly demonstrations held by the Israelite School of Universal Practical Knowledge (ISUPK). The demonstrations take place on a public sidewalk, directly abutting one of the five entrances to the Shops at Liberty Place, owned by the Liberty Place Retail Associates L.P. Both the Common Pleas and Superior courts found that neither a trespass nor private nuisance was proven.

The trial court found that the ISUPK demonstrations were protected by the First Amendment and that Liberty Place Retail Associates failed to show that the demonstrations are either a private nuisance or a trespass. Liberty Place raised all three findings as errors of law for Superior Court review. The content of ISUPK’s speech was discussed but the Superior Court did not address the trial court’s finding holding that the First Amendment provides a defense to the Shops’ claims. The Superior Court cited the preference to dispose of cases on non-constitutional grounds.

Anyone living in a major metropolitan area such as Philadelphia is familiar with people exercising their First Amendment right to freedom of speech in some manner. In recent years, the city has seen demonstrations relating to the second Iraq War, the public school system budget cuts and Occupy Wall Street. Although such activities can cause traffic jams and other congestion, these are issues of high relevance. Other demonstrators have views that are overwhelmingly perceived as hateful, such as the Westboro Baptist Church, whose right to shout out the most hateful and loathsome epithets at mourners at military funerals was upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court in an 8-1 decision.

Most would agree that ISUPK falls into the odious category. But it is black-letter law that it is the most controversial and obnoxious speech that is in most need of protection. ISUPK, designated an “extremist” group by the Southern Poverty Law Center, has been exercising its First Amendment rights at the corner of 16th and Chestnut streets at the busiest of the five entrances of the Shops at Liberty Place since Nov. 30, 2012. After the Shops blocked the public sidewalk, ISUPK moved into the setback area—the Shops were under the mistaken belief that it owned the sidewalk outside of its building. A preliminary injunction was issued and ISUPK moved back to the public sidewalk, causing the Shops to seek a permanent injunction prohibiting ISUPK to demonstrate on the public sidewalk. And therein is the crux of the controversy. Are the ISUPK demonstrations held so close to the private setback that they are both a nuisance and a trespass?

Although ISUPK never again entered the setback area, the Shops argued a trespass was ongoing. On appeal, the Superior Court engaged in a de novo and plenary review, analyzing whether the trial court erred in denying the Shops’ permanent injunction request. Also, as in all equity matters, the appeals court gave great deference to the lower court’s factual findings. As to both the trespass and nuisance claims, it should be noted that Pennsylvania has essentially adopted the Restatement of Torts sections in defining these causes of action.

Approximately 15,000 people per day pass through the Shops’ entrances on a given weekday. ISUPK demonstrates on average once a week, usually on a Friday. Its president testified that the site was chosen because of the broad range of people that pass through as well as the juxtaposition of wealth and poverty. In addition to amplified voices, there are ISUPK signs and placards. Its message, a one-page single-spaced excerpt, is contained in the opinion, and is replete with invective against gays, all white people, all Asians and any African-American who does not subscribe to its ideology. ISUPK has never been cited for violating the city code and none of its members have ever been arrested at an ISUPK demonstration; it is undeniable that they are loud.

The Shops’ primary contention was that the passerby and onlookers tended to gather in the private setback area during these demonstrations. It was also argued that ISUPK was aware of the likelihood that its conduct would lead to such an assembly on its property. To succeed in a claim for trespass, the plaintiff must prove that the other party intentionally entered land in the possession of another or caused a third person to do so; harm to any legally protected interest is not necessarily required. As for the intent, a critical aspect of the court’s analysis, the Restatement of Torts concerns itself with an actor’s desire to cause consequences or his or her belief that the consequences are substantially certain to result from certain acts. It is this “substantially certain” aspect of the Shops’ argument with which the appeals court takes serious exception. It was not sufficient to merely posit that ISUPK knew that its conduct would lead to a crowd gathering in the setback area. Rather, the Shops were required to demonstrate, either via persuasive authority or additional proof, that such an outcome was indeed substantially certain. “Mere knowledge of likelihood was legally insufficient proof,” according to the opinion. For the Shops, its inability to produce more evidence proved fatal. As to the private nuisance claim, the Shops took issue with the lower court’s analysis: It limited its analysis to noise level and pecuniary harm. Liberty Place presented no scientific evidence that measured the increased decibel caused by ISUPK or that its activities caused the Shops’ lost profits. More precisely, the Shops contended that the gathering of crowds on private property, as is the case here, is sufficient to warrant relief under this theory.

Summarizing the Restatement as it pertains to nuisance, one may be liable for private nuisance if his or her intentional, reckless or negligent conduct is a legal cause of an invasion of another’s interest in the private use and enjoyment of land. Liberty Place cited a number of Pennsylvania trial and appellate cases favorable to the landowner. Such cases examined nuisance bars, slanderous and abusive language outside of a private residence and a local airport that caused dust, crowds and noise to interfere with the operation of a sanitarium in rural Chester County. All were found inapposite since Liberty Place is in the business of attracting crowds—not keeping them away—the demonstrations are in a public place and ISUPK activities can hardly be compared to a nuisance bar. The mere gathering of crowds is simply not enough in Pennsylvania to warrant relief for private nuisance. A prime commercial location may also be a prime location for a group to aggressively exercise its First Amendment rights. Although one may sympathize with the predicament in which Liberty Place finds itself, a nuisance or trespass still must be proven, no matter how offensive the message of those demonstrating legally in a public place may be. Our courts may be sending a message that a stronger quantum of proof may be necessary in such circumstances for the property owner to succeed in enjoining such demonstrations.

Philadelphia Legal Malpractice Lawyer

Philadelphia Legal Malpractice Lawyer

What follows is a snippet of the law courts in Pennsylvania will apply to a claim for legal malpractice:

In a trespass [legal malpractice] action, the plaintiff [the aggrieved client] must establish three (3) elements in order to recover: (1) the employment of the attorney or other basis for duty; (2) the failure of the attorney to exercise ordinary skill and knowledge; and (3) that the attorney’s failure to exercise the requisite level of skill and knowledge was the proximate cause of damage to the plaintiff. Bailey v. Tucker, 533 Pa. 237, 246, 621 A.2d 108, 112 (1993). An attorney will be deemed “negligent” if he or she fails to possess and exercise that degree of knowledge, skill and care which would normally be exercised by members of the profession under the same or similar circumstances. Collas v. Garnick, 425 Pa. Super. 8, 13, 624 A.2d 117, 120, appeal denied, 535 Pa. 672, 636 A.2d 631 (1993).

Please keep these factors mind when considering your own circumstances (even if you are still being represented by that attorney or law firm). It is incumbent on the client to bring suit within two (2) years time and therefore any questions should be communicated confidentially to a legal malpractice firm and as expeditiously as possible. Attorney Dimmerman provides free, initial consultations — so call now: (215) 545-0600. He is now considering legal malpractice matters. This is a recently added practice area for Mr. Dimmerman.